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【跟踪】 6.9 系列合并 6.6 补丁情况一览 #1

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MingcongBai opened this issue Jun 26, 2024 · 1 comment
Closed

【跟踪】 6.9 系列合并 6.6 补丁情况一览 #1

MingcongBai opened this issue Jun 26, 2024 · 1 comment

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@MingcongBai
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MingcongBai commented Jun 26, 2024

本工单用于跟踪从 6.6 分支引入的厂商补丁的移植情况,本次移植后,补丁后续将以 cherry-pick 的形式变基到各 rolling-stable 最新分支

下方缩进项指代顶层依赖项

当前代码基础

6.9.6

外设支持类(显卡)

外设支持类(网卡)

平台支持类(飞腾)

平台支持类(AArch64 通用)

平台支持类(龙架构)

平台支持类(海光)

平台支持类(兆芯)

平台支持类(Intel)

平台支持类(其他 x86 厂商)

平台支持类(x86 通用)

发布管理类

@MingcongBai MingcongBai pinned this issue Jun 30, 2024
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit ccb326b ]

Running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer overflow
sanitizer shows this report:

[   62.982337] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   62.985692] cgroup: Invalid name
[   62.986211] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../block/ioctl.c:36:46
[   62.989370] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7343): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[   62.992992] 9223372036854775807 + 4095 cannot be represented in type 'long long'
[   62.997827] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7345): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[   62.999369] random: crng reseeded on system resumption
[   63.000634] GUP no longer grows the stack in syz-executor.2 (7353): 20002000-20003000 (20001000)
[   63.000668] CPU: 0 PID: 7353 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1
[   63.000677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   63.000682] Call Trace:
[   63.000686]  <TASK>
[   63.000731]  dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
[   63.000919]  __get_user_pages+0x903/0xd30
[   63.001030]  __gup_longterm_locked+0x153e/0x1ba0
[   63.001041]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x50
[   63.001072]  ? try_get_folio+0x29c/0x2d0
[   63.001083]  internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x1119/0x1530
[   63.001109]  iov_iter_extract_pages+0x23b/0x580
[   63.001206]  bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x4de/0x1220
[   63.001235]  iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x9b6/0x1410
[   63.001297]  __iomap_dio_rw+0xab4/0x1810
[   63.001316]  iomap_dio_rw+0x45/0xa0
[   63.001328]  ext4_file_write_iter+0xdde/0x1390
[   63.001372]  vfs_write+0x599/0xbd0
[   63.001394]  ksys_write+0xc8/0x190
[   63.001403]  do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x1b0
[   63.001421]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3a/0x60
[   63.001479]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
[   63.001535] RIP: 0033:0x7f7fd3ebf539
[   63.001551] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   63.001562] RSP: 002b:00007f7fd32570c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   63.001584] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 RCX: 00007f7fd3ebf539
[   63.001590] RDX: 4db6d1e4f7e43360 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
[   63.001595] RBP: 00007f7fd3f1e496 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   63.001599] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[   63.001604] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 R15: 00007ffd415ad2b8
...
[   63.018142] ---[ end trace ]---

Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the
kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been
changed [1] in the newest version of Clang; It was re-enabled in the
kernel with Commit 557f8c5 ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow
sanitizer").

Let's rework this overflow checking logic to not actually perform an
overflow during the check itself, thus avoiding the UBSAN splat.

[1]: llvm/llvm-project#82432

Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit 730fffc ]

During live migration of a virtual machine, the SR-IOV VF need to be
re-registered. It may fail when the memory is badly fragmented.

The related log is as follows.

    kernel: hv_netvsc 6045bdaa-c0d1-6045-bdaa-c0d16045bdaa eth0: VF slot 1 added
...
    kernel: kworker/0:0: page allocation failure: order:7, mode:0x40dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
    kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 24006 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G            E     5.4...x86_64 #1
    kernel: Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008  12/07/2018
    kernel: Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
    kernel: Call Trace:
    kernel: dump_stack+0x8b/0xc8
    kernel: warn_alloc+0xff/0x170
    kernel: __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x92c/0xb2b
    kernel: ? get_page_from_freelist+0x1d4/0x1140
    kernel: __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2f9/0x320
    kernel: alloc_pages_current+0x6a/0xb0
    kernel: kmalloc_order+0x1e/0x70
    kernel: kmalloc_order_trace+0x26/0xb0
    kernel: ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
    kernel: __kmalloc+0x276/0x280
    kernel: ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1e/0x40
    kernel: devlink_alloc+0x29/0x110
    kernel: mlx5_devlink_alloc+0x1a/0x20 [mlx5_core]
    kernel: init_one+0x1d/0x650 [mlx5_core]
    kernel: local_pci_probe+0x46/0x90
    kernel: work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30
    kernel: process_one_work+0x16d/0x390
    kernel: worker_thread+0x1d3/0x3f0
    kernel: kthread+0x105/0x140
    kernel: ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
    kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x20/0x20
    kernel: ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Signed-off-by: Jian Wen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit f1e197a ]

trace_drop_common() is called with preemption disabled, and it acquires
a spin_lock. This is problematic for RT kernels because spin_locks are
sleeping locks in this configuration, which causes the following splat:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 449, name: rcuc/47
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
5 locks held by rcuc/47/449:
 #0: ff1100086ec30a60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock)){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x105/0x210
 #1: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0xbf/0x130
 #2: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x11c/0x210
 #3: ffffffffb394a160 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch+0x360/0xc70
 #4: ff1100086ee07520 (&data->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
irq event stamp: 139909
hardirqs last  enabled at (139908): [<ffffffffb1df2b33>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x63/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (139909): [<ffffffffb19bd03d>] trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x26d/0x290
softirqs last  enabled at (139892): [<ffffffffb07a1083>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x103/0x170
softirqs last disabled at (139898): [<ffffffffb0909b33>] rcu_cpu_kthread+0x93/0x1f0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffffb1de786b>] rt_mutex_slowunlock+0xab/0x2e0
CPU: 47 PID: 449 Comm: rcuc/47 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-rt1+ #7
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R650/0Y2G81, BIOS 1.6.5 04/15/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xd0
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __might_resched+0x21e/0x2f0
 rt_spin_lock+0x5e/0x130
 ? trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x80
 ? __pfx_trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x26a/0x2e0
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 ? __pfx_rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x10/0x10
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 trace_kfree_skb_hit+0x15/0x20
 trace_kfree_skb+0xe9/0x150
 kfree_skb_reason+0x7b/0x110
 skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 ? __pfx_skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x10/0x10
 ? mark_lock.part.0+0x8a/0x520
...

trace_drop_common() also disables interrupts, but this is a minor issue
because we could easily replace it with a local_lock.

Replace the spin_lock with raw_spin_lock to avoid sleeping in atomic
context.

Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hu Chunyu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit 28027ec ]

The qedi_dbg_do_not_recover_cmd_read() function invokes sprintf() directly
on a __user pointer, which results into the crash.

To fix this issue, use a small local stack buffer for sprintf() and then
call simple_read_from_buffer(), which in turns make the copy_to_user()
call.

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f4801111000
PGD 8000000864df6067 P4D 8000000864df6067 PUD 864df7067 PMD 846028067 PTE 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 06/15/2023
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xcd/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffffb7a18c3ffc40 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00007f4801111000 RBX: 00007f4801111000 RCX: 000000000000000f
RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: ffffffffc0bfd7a0 RDI: 00007f4801111000
RBP: ffffffffc0bfd7a0 R08: 725f746f6e5f6f64 R09: 3d7265766f636572
R10: ffffb7a18c3ffd08 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f4881110fff
R13: 000000007fffffff R14: ffffb7a18c3ffca0 R15: ffffffffc0bfd7af
FS:  00007f480118a740(0000) GS:ffff98e38af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4801111000 CR3: 0000000864b8e001 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
 ? page_fault_oops+0x183/0x510
 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 ? memcpy_orig+0xcd/0x130
 vsnprintf+0x102/0x4c0
 sprintf+0x51/0x80
 qedi_dbg_do_not_recover_cmd_read+0x2f/0x50 [qedi 6bcfdeeecdea037da47069eca2ba717c84a77324]
 full_proxy_read+0x50/0x80
 vfs_read+0xa5/0x2e0
 ? folio_add_new_anon_rmap+0x44/0xa0
 ? set_pte_at+0x15/0x30
 ? do_pte_missing+0x426/0x7f0
 ksys_read+0xa5/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
 ? __count_memcg_events+0x46/0x90
 ? count_memcg_event_mm+0x3d/0x60
 ? handle_mm_fault+0x196/0x2f0
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x890
 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f4800f20b4d

Tested-by: Martin Hoyer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Meneghini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Manish Rangankar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit af0cb3f ]

Xiumei and Christoph reported the following lockdep splat, complaining of
the qdisc root lock being taken twice:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 6.7.0-rc3+ torvalds#598 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 swapper/2/0 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888177190110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1560/0x2e70

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88811995a110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1560/0x2e70

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&sch->q.lock);
   lock(&sch->q.lock);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

 5 locks held by swapper/2/0:
  #0: ffff888135a09d98 ((&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x11a/0x510
  #1: ffffffffaaee5260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x2c0/0x1ed0
  #2: ffffffffaaee5200 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x209/0x2e70
  #3: ffff88811995a110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1560/0x2e70
  #4: ffffffffaaee5200 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x209/0x2e70

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3+ torvalds#598
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module+el8.3.0+7353+9de0a3cc 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
  __lock_acquire+0xfdd/0x3150
  lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x540
  _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1560/0x2e70
  tcf_mirred_act+0x82e/0x1260 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x161/0x480
  tcf_classify+0x689/0x1170
  prio_enqueue+0x316/0x660 [sch_prio]
  dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x46/0x220
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1615/0x2e70
  ip_finish_output2+0x1218/0x1ed0
  __ip_finish_output+0x8b3/0x1350
  ip_output+0x163/0x4e0
  igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x44b/0x930
  call_timer_fn+0x1a2/0x510
  run_timer_softirq+0x54d/0x11a0
  __do_softirq+0x1b3/0x88f
  irq_exit_rcu+0x18f/0x1e0
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0x90
  </IRQ>

This happens when TC does a mirred egress redirect from the root qdisc of
device A to the root qdisc of device B. As long as these two locks aren't
protecting the same qdisc, they can be acquired in chain: add a per-qdisc
lockdep key to silence false warnings.
This dynamic key should safely replace the static key we have in sch_htb:
it was added to allow enqueueing to the device "direct qdisc" while still
holding the qdisc root lock.

v2: don't use static keys anymore in HTB direct qdiscs (thanks Eric Dumazet)

CC: Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>
CC: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#451
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7dc06d6158f72053cf877a82e2a7a5bd23692faa.1713448007.git.dcaratti@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit f6944d4 ]

Lockdep reports the below circular locking dependency issue.  The
mmap_lock acquisition while holding pci_bus_sem is due to the use of
copy_to_user() from within a pci_walk_bus() callback.

Building the devices array directly into the user buffer is only for
convenience.  Instead we can allocate a local buffer for the array,
bounded by the number of devices on the bus/slot, fill the device
information into this local buffer, then copy it into the user buffer
outside the bus walk callback.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5+ torvalds#39 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
CPU 0/KVM/4113 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff99a609ee18a8 (&vdev->vma_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]

but task is already holding lock:
ffff99a243a052a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vaddr_get_pfns+0x3f/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       __might_fault+0x5c/0x80
       _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x60
       vfio_pci_fill_devs+0x9f/0x130 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_walk_wrapper+0x45/0x60 [vfio_pci_core]
       __pci_walk_bus+0x6b/0xb0
       vfio_pci_ioctl_get_pci_hot_reset_info+0x10b/0x1d0 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x1cb/0x400 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x7e/0x140 [vfio]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #2 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       down_read+0x3e/0x160
       pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus.part.0+0x33/0x2d0
       pci_reset_bus+0xdd/0x160
       vfio_pci_dev_set_hot_reset+0x256/0x270 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_ioctl_pci_hot_reset_groups+0x1a3/0x280 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x3b5/0x400 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x7e/0x140 [vfio]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       down_write+0x3b/0xc0
       vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock+0x1c/0x30 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_basic_config_write+0x281/0x340 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_config_do_rw+0x1fa/0x300 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_config_rw+0x75/0xe50 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_rw+0xea/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfs_write+0xea/0x520
       __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x90/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&vdev->vma_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add+0xeb/0xcc0
       validate_chain+0x465/0x530
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x97/0xde0
       vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
       __do_fault+0x31/0x160
       do_pte_missing+0x65/0x3b0
       __handle_mm_fault+0x303/0x720
       handle_mm_fault+0x10f/0x460
       fixup_user_fault+0x7f/0x1f0
       follow_fault_pfn+0x66/0x1c0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vaddr_get_pfns+0xf2/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_pin_pages_remote+0x348/0x4e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_pin_map_dma+0xd2/0x330 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_dma_do_map+0x2c0/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xc5/0x1d0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &vdev->vma_lock --> pci_bus_sem --> &mm->mmap_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

block dm-0: the capability attribute has been deprecated.
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                               lock(pci_bus_sem);
                               lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  lock(&vdev->vma_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by CPU 0/KVM/4113:
 #0: ffff99a25f294888 (&iommu->lock#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_dma_do_map+0x60/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 #1: ffff99a243a052a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vaddr_get_pfns+0x3f/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4113 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5+ torvalds#39
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T640/04WYPY, BIOS 2.15.1 06/16/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0xa0
 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150
 check_prev_add+0xeb/0xcc0
 ? add_chain_cache+0x10a/0x2f0
 ? __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
 validate_chain+0x465/0x530
 __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
 lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
 __mutex_lock+0x97/0xde0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 __do_fault+0x31/0x160
 do_pte_missing+0x65/0x3b0
 __handle_mm_fault+0x303/0x720
 handle_mm_fault+0x10f/0x460
 fixup_user_fault+0x7f/0x1f0
 follow_fault_pfn+0x66/0x1c0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vaddr_get_pfns+0xf2/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_pin_pages_remote+0x348/0x4e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_pin_map_dma+0xd2/0x330 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_dma_do_map+0x2c0/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xc5/0x1d0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
 ? rcu_core+0x8d/0x250
 ? __lock_release+0x5e/0x160
 ? rcu_core+0x8d/0x250
 ? lock_release+0x5f/0x120
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xb/0x190
 ? irqtime_account_irq+0x40/0xc0
 ? __local_bh_enable+0x54/0x60
 ? __do_softirq+0x315/0x3ca
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x97/0x140
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f8300d0357b
Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 68 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f82ef3fb948 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f8300d0357b
RDX: 00007f82ef3fb990 RSI: 0000000000003b71 RDI: 0000000000000023
RBP: 00007f82ef3fb9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000561b7e0bcac2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000200000000 R14: 0000381800000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit cebae29 ]

Shin'ichiro reported that when he's running fstests' test-case
btrfs/167 on emulated zoned devices, he's seeing the following NULL
pointer dereference in 'btrfs_zone_finish_endio()':

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f]
  CPU: 4 PID: 2332440 Comm: kworker/u80:15 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-kts+ #4
  Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs]

  RSP: 0018:ffff88867f107a90 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff893e5534
  RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088
  RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1081696028
  R10: ffff88840b4b0143 R11: ffff88834dfff600 R12: ffff88840b4b0000
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888530ad5210
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888e3f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f87223fff38 CR3: 00000007a7c6a002 CR4: 00000000007706f0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
   ? die_addr+0x46/0x70
   ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x250
   ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
   ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70
   ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x5d9/0x19a0 [btrfs]
   ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
   ? do_raw_write_lock+0x90/0x260
   ? __pfx_do_raw_write_lock+0x10/0x10
   ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
   ? _raw_write_unlock+0x23/0x40
   ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x5a9/0x850 [btrfs]
   ? lock_acquire+0x435/0x500
   btrfs_work_helper+0x1b1/0xa70 [btrfs]
   ? __schedule+0x10a8/0x60b0
   ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
   process_one_work+0x862/0x1410
   ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
   ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
   ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
   worker_thread+0x5e6/0x1010
   ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
   kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0
   ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xce/0x110
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   </TASK>

Enabling CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT revealed the following assertion to
trigger:

  assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list), in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1815

This indicates, that we're missing the checksums list on the
ordered_extent. As btrfs/167 is doing a NOCOW write this is to be
expected.

Further analysis with drgn confirmed the assumption:

  >>> inode = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[11]['ordered'].inode
  >>> btrfs_inode = drgn.container_of(inode, "struct btrfs_inode", \
         				"vfs_inode")
  >>> print(btrfs_inode.flags)
  (u32)1

As zoned emulation mode simulates conventional zones on regular devices,
we cannot use zone-append for writing. But we're only attaching dummy
checksums if we're doing a zone-append write.

So for NOCOW zoned data writes on conventional zones, also attach a
dummy checksum.

Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Fixes: cbfce4c ("btrfs: optimize the logical to physical mapping for zoned writes")
CC: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> # 6.6+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit 2eab454 ]

syzbot reminds us that in6_dev_get() can return NULL.

fib6_nh_init()
    ip6_validate_gw(  &idev  )
        ip6_route_check_nh(  idev  )
            *idev = in6_dev_get(dev); // can be NULL

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7]
CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024
 RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_init+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606
Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8
RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8
R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  ip6_route_info_create+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809
  ip6_route_add+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853
  ipv6_route_ioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483
  inet6_ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:579
  sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
  sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
  vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
  __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
  __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9

Fixes: 428604f ("ipv6: do not set routes if disable_ipv6 has been enabled")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit b86762d ]

syzbot caught a NULL dereference in rt6_probe() [1]

Bail out if  __in6_dev_get() returns NULL.

[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000658-0x000000000000065f]
CPU: 1 PID: 22444 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
 RIP: 0010:rt6_probe net/ipv6/route.c:656 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:find_match+0x8c4/0xf50 net/ipv6/route.c:758
Code: 14 fd f7 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 8d b8 5c 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 19
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034af070 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004521000
RDX: 00000000000000cb RSI: ffffffff8990d0cd RDI: 000000000000065c
RBP: ffffc900034af150 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff92000695e18 R14: ffff8880244a1d20 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f4844a5a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b31b27000 CR3: 000000002d42c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  rt6_nh_find_match+0xfa/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:784
  nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh+0x26d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1496
  __find_rr_leaf+0x6e7/0xe00 net/ipv6/route.c:825
  find_rr_leaf net/ipv6/route.c:853 [inline]
  rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:897 [inline]
  fib6_table_lookup+0x57e/0xa30 net/ipv6/route.c:2195
  ip6_pol_route+0x1cd/0x1150 net/ipv6/route.c:2231
  pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:616 [inline]
  fib6_rule_lookup+0x386/0x720 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121
  ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2639 [inline]
  ip6_route_output_flags+0x1d0/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
  ip6_dst_lookup_tail.constprop.0+0x961/0x1760 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1147
  ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x99/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250
  rawv6_sendmsg+0xdab/0x4340 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
  inet_sendmsg+0x119/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
  sock_write_iter+0x4b8/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1160
  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
  vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590
  ksys_write+0x1f8/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 52e1635 ("[IPV6]: ROUTE: Add router_probe_interval sysctl.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit d464010 ]

ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly.

syzbot reported:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker
 RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64
Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98
RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000
R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline]
  xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline]
  xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541
  xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835
  xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline]
  xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201
  xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline]
  xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309
  ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256
  send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139
  wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178
  wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200
  wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40
  wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51
  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
….DX6 behaviors

[ Upstream commit 9a3bc8d ]

input_action_end_dx4() and input_action_end_dx6() are called NF_HOOK() for
PREROUTING hook, in PREROUTING hook, we should passing a valid indev,
and a NULL outdev to NF_HOOK(), otherwise may trigger a NULL pointer
dereference, as below:

    [74830.647293] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090
    [74830.655633] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [74830.657888] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [74830.659500] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [74830.660450] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
    ...
    [74830.664953] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
    [74830.666569] RIP: 0010:rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]
    ...
    [74830.689725] Call Trace:
    [74830.690402]  <IRQ>
    [74830.690953]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
    [74830.692020]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
    [74830.693095]  ? ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]
    [74830.694275]  ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
    [74830.695205]  ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140
    [74830.696244]  ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
    [74830.697225]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
    [74830.698344]  ? rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]
    [74830.699540]  ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]
    [74830.700758]  ? ip6_route_input+0x19d/0x240
    [74830.701752]  nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xb0
    [74830.702678]  input_action_end_dx4+0x19b/0x1e0
    [74830.703735]  ? input_action_end_t+0xe0/0xe0
    [74830.704734]  seg6_local_input_core+0x2d/0x60
    [74830.705782]  lwtunnel_input+0x5b/0xb0
    [74830.706690]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x63/0xa0
    [74830.707825]  process_backlog+0x99/0x140
    [74830.709538]  __napi_poll+0x2c/0x160
    [74830.710673]  net_rx_action+0x296/0x350
    [74830.711860]  __do_softirq+0xcb/0x2ac
    [74830.713049]  do_softirq+0x63/0x90

input_action_end_dx4() passing a NULL indev to NF_HOOK(), and finally
trigger a NULL dereference in rpfilter_mt()->rpfilter_is_loopback():

    static bool
    rpfilter_is_loopback(const struct sk_buff *skb,
          	       const struct net_device *in)
    {
            // in is NULL
            return skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK ||
          	 in->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK;
    }

Fixes: 7a3f5b0 ("netfilter: add netfilter hooks to SRv6 data plane")
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
commit 9a95c5b upstream.

A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
               BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
      7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
      f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
      44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
 path_openat+0x571/0x1720
 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Commit c7423db ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry->action	|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423db ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
@MingcongBai MingcongBai changed the title 【跟踪】6.9 系列合并 6.6 补丁情况一览 【跟踪】 6.9 系列合并 6.6 补丁情况一览 Jul 18, 2024
@MingcongBai
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当前稳定分支已切换为 6.10,请见 #10

@MingcongBai MingcongBai unpinned this issue Aug 26, 2024
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs() clean up admin vq
resources by virtio_pci_vq_info pointer. The info pointer of admin
vq is stored in vp_dev->admin_vq.info instead of vp_dev->vqs[].
Using the info pointer from vp_dev->vqs[] for admin vq causes a
kernel NULL pointer dereference bug.
In vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs(), get the info pointer
from vp_dev->admin_vq.info for admin vq to clean up the resources.
Also make info ptr as argument of vp_del_vq() to be symmetric with
vp_setup_vq().

vp_reset calls vp_modern_avq_cleanup, and causes the Call Trace:
==================================================================
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:0000000000000000
...
CPU: 49 UID: 0 PID: 4439 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5 #1
RIP: 0010:vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
...
 ? vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci]
 ? vp_reset+0x38/0x90 [virtio_pci]
 virtio_reset_device+0x1d/0x30
 remove_vq_common+0x1c/0x1a0 [virtio_net]
 virtnet_remove+0xa1/0xc0 [virtio_net]
 virtio_dev_remove+0x46/0xa0
...
 virtio_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0x810 [virtio_pci]
==================================================================

Fixes: 4c3b54a ("virtio_pci_modern: use completion instead of busy loop to wait on admin cmd result")
Signed-off-by: Feng Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
In the error recovery path of mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), the cleanup is
executed and at the end put_device() is called which ends up calling
mlx5_vdpa_free(). This function will execute the same cleanup all over
again. Most resources support being cleaned up twice, but the recent
mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() doesn't.

This change drops the explicit cleanup from within the
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add() and lets mlx5_vdpa_free() do its work.

This issue was discovered while trying to add 2 vdpa devices with the
same name:
$> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.2
$> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.3

... yields the following dump:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b8
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2811 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6 #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0
  Code: ...
  RSP: 0018:ffff88814920b9a8 EFLAGS: 00010282
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105c10000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888100400168 RDI: 0000000000000000
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100120c00 R09: ffffffff828578c0
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff888131fd99a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888105c10580
  FS:  00007fdfa6b4f740(0000) GS:ffff88852ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000000000b8 CR3: 000000018db09006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __die+0x20/0x60
   ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0
   ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x130
   ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
   ? destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0
   mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x2b/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa]
   mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa]
   vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa]
   device_release+0x31/0x90
   kobject_put+0x8d/0x230
   mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x328/0x8b0 [mlx5_vdpa]
   vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2b8/0x4c0 [vdpa]
   genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
   genl_rcv_msg+0x180/0x2b0
   ? __vdpa_alloc_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [vdpa]
   ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0
   netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
   genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
   netlink_unicast+0x1fc/0x2d0
   netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x410
   __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
   ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x60
   __sys_sendto+0x105/0x160
   ? __count_memcg_events+0x53/0xe0
   ? handle_mm_fault+0x100/0x220
   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40d/0x620
   __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7fdfa6c66b57
  Code: ...
  RSP: 002b:00007ffeace22998 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a498608350 RCX: 00007fdfa6c66b57
  RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: 000055a498608350 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 00007ffeace229c0 R08: 00007fdfa6d35200 R09: 000000000000000c
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055a4986082a0
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeace233f3
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in: ...
  CR2: 00000000000000b8

Fixes: 6211165 ("vdpa/mlx5: Postpone MR deletion")
Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
Eric reported a division by zero splat in the MPTCP protocol:

Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6094 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00291-g05b92660cdfe #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x5b4/0x1310 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3163
Code: f6 44 01 e3 89 df e8 9b 75 09 f8 44 39 f3 0f 8d 11 ff ff ff e8
0d 74 09 f8 45 89 f4 e9 04 ff ff ff e8 00 74 09 f8 44 89 f0 99 <f7> 7c
24 14 41 29 d6 45 89 f4 e9 ec fe ff ff e8 e8 73 09 f8 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc900041f7930 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000017e67 RBX: 0000000000017e67 RCX: ffffffff8983314b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff898331b0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000005d6000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000017e67
R10: 0000000000003e80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000003e80
R13: ffff888031d9b440 R14: 0000000000017e67 R15: 00000000002eb000
FS: 00007feb5d7f16c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007feb5d8adbb8 CR3: 0000000074e4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0x3e7/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1493
mptcp_rcv_space_adjust net/mptcp/protocol.c:2085 [inline]
mptcp_recvmsg+0x2156/0x2600 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2289
inet_recvmsg+0x469/0x6a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:885
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1051 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1b2/0x250 net/socket.c:1073
__sys_recvfrom+0x1a5/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2265
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2283 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2279 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2279
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7feb5d857559
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007feb5d7f1208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007feb5d8e1318 RCX: 00007feb5d857559
RDX: 000000800000000e RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007feb5d8e1310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff81000000
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007feb5d8e131c
R13: 00007feb5d8ae074 R14: 000000800000000e R15: 00000000fffffdef

and provided a nice reproducer.

The root cause is the current bad handling of racing disconnect.
After the blamed commit below, sk_wait_data() can return (with
error) with the underlying socket disconnected and a zero rcv_mss.

Catch the error and return without performing any additional
operations on the current socket.

Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes: 419ce13 ("tcp: allow again tcp_disconnect() when threads are waiting")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8c82ecf71662ecbc47bf390f9905de70884c9f2d.1731060874.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
syzbot and Daan report a NULL pointer crash in the new full swap cluster
reclaim work:

> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
> Workqueue: events swap_reclaim_work
> RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x20/0x1c0 lib/list_debug.c:49
> Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 fe 48 83 c7 08 48 83 ec 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 19 01 00 00 48 89 f2 48 8b 4e 08 48 b8 00 00 00
> RSP: 0018:ffffc90000bb7c30 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807b9ae078
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000008
> RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000004f R12: dffffc0000000000
> R13: ffffffffffffffb8 R14: ffff88807b9ae000 R15: ffffc90003af1000
> FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00007fffaca68fb8 CR3: 00000000791c8000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
>  __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
>  list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
>  swap_reclaim_full_clusters+0x109/0x460 mm/swapfile.c:748
>  swap_reclaim_work+0x2e/0x40 mm/swapfile.c:779

The syzbot console output indicates a virtual environment where swapfile
is on a rotational device.  In this case, clusters aren't actually used,
and si->full_clusters is not initialized.  Daan's report is from qemu, so
likely rotational too.

Make sure to only schedule the cluster reclaim work when clusters are
actually in use.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Link: systemd/systemd#35044
Fixes: 5168a68 ("mm, swap: avoid over reclaim of full clusters")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Daan De Meyer <[email protected]>
Cc: Kairui Song <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
The kdump kernel is broken on SME systems with CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y enabled.
Debugging traced the issue back to

  b69a2af ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec").

Testing was previously not conducted on SME systems with CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
enabled, which led to the oversight, with the following incarnation:

...
  ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
  Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates
  Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 18ae0bc7e79b64700122bb1d6a904b070fef2656'
  ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xcfacfdfe6660003e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2+ #14
  Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS 1.20.0 05/03/2023
  RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? show_trace_log_lvl
   ? show_trace_log_lvl
   ? ima_load_kexec_buffer
   ? __die_body.cold
   ? die_addr
   ? exc_general_protection
   ? asm_exc_general_protection
   ? ima_restore_measurement_list
   ? vprintk_emit
   ? ima_load_kexec_buffer
   ima_load_kexec_buffer
   ima_init
   ? __pfx_init_ima
   init_ima
   ? __pfx_init_ima
   do_one_initcall
   do_initcalls
   ? __pfx_kernel_init
   kernel_init_freeable
   kernel_init
   ret_from_fork
   ? __pfx_kernel_init
   ret_from_fork_asm
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  ...
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
  Kernel Offset: disabled
  Rebooting in 10 seconds..

Adding debug printks showed that the stored addr and size of ima_kexec buffer
are not decrypted correctly like:

  ima: ima_load_kexec_buffer, buffer:0xcfacfdfe6660003e, size:0xe48066052d5df359

Three types of setup_data info

  — SETUP_EFI,
  - SETUP_IMA, and
  - SETUP_RNG_SEED

are passed to the kexec/kdump kernel. Only the ima_kexec buffer
experienced incorrect decryption. Debugging identified a bug in
early_memremap_is_setup_data(), where an incorrect range calculation
occurred due to the len variable in struct setup_data ended up only
representing the length of the data field, excluding the struct's size,
and thus leading to miscalculation.

Address a similar issue in memremap_is_setup_data() while at it.

  [ bp: Heavily massage. ]

Fixes: b3c72fc ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2024
Accessing `mr_table->mfc_cache_list` is protected by an RCU lock. In the
following code flow, the RCU read lock is not held, causing the
following error when `RCU_PROVE` is not held. The same problem might
show up in the IPv6 code path.

	6.12.0-rc5-kbuilder-01145-gbac17284bdcb #33 Tainted: G            E    N
	-----------------------------
	net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:313 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

	rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
		   2 locks held by RetransmitAggre/3519:
		    #0: ffff88816188c6c0 (nlk_cb_mutex-ROUTE){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __netlink_dump_start+0x8a/0x290
		    #1: ffffffff83fcf7a8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_dumpit+0x6b/0x90

	stack backtrace:
		    lockdep_rcu_suspicious
		    mr_table_dump
		    ipmr_rtm_dumproute
		    rtnl_dump_all
		    rtnl_dumpit
		    netlink_dump
		    __netlink_dump_start
		    rtnetlink_rcv_msg
		    netlink_rcv_skb
		    netlink_unicast
		    netlink_sendmsg

This is not a problem per see, since the RTNL lock is held here, so, it
is safe to iterate in the list without the RCU read lock, as suggested
by Eric.

To alleviate the concern, modify the code to use
list_for_each_entry_rcu() with the RTNL-held argument.

The annotation will raise an error only if RTNL or RCU read lock are
missing during iteration, signaling a legitimate problem, otherwise it
will avoid this false positive.

This will solve the IPv6 case as well, since ip6mr_rtm_dumproute() calls
this function as well.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 6aecd91 ]

[BUG]
Syzbot reported a crash with the following call trace:

  BTRFS info (device loop0): scrub: started on devid 1
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000208
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 106e70067 P4D 106e70067 PUD 107143067 PMD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 689 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           O       6.13.0-rc4-custom+ torvalds#206
  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
  RIP: 0010:find_first_extent_item+0x26/0x1f0 [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   scrub_find_fill_first_stripe+0x13d/0x3b0 [btrfs]
   scrub_simple_mirror+0x175/0x260 [btrfs]
   scrub_stripe+0x5d4/0x6c0 [btrfs]
   scrub_chunk+0xbb/0x170 [btrfs]
   scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_scrub_dev+0x240/0x600 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x1dc8/0x2fa0 [btrfs]
   ? do_sys_openat2+0xa5/0xf0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0
   do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   </TASK>

[CAUSE]
The reproducer is using a corrupted image where extent tree root is
corrupted, thus forcing to use "rescue=all,ro" mount option to mount the
image.

Then it triggered a scrub, but since scrub relies on extent tree to find
where the data/metadata extents are, scrub_find_fill_first_stripe()
relies on an non-empty extent root.

But unfortunately scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() doesn't really expect
an NULL pointer for extent root, it use extent_root to grab fs_info and
triggered a NULL pointer dereference.

[FIX]
Add an extra check for a valid extent root at the beginning of
scrub_find_fill_first_stripe().

The new error path is introduced by 42437a6 ("btrfs: introduce
mount option rescue=ignorebadroots"), but that's pretty old, and later
commit b979547 ("btrfs: scrub: introduce helper to find and fill
sector info for a scrub_stripe") changed how we do scrub.

So for kernels older than 6.6, the fix will need manual backport.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 42437a6 ("btrfs: introduce mount option rescue=ignorebadroots")
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 2d2d4f6 ]

We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system.  The
reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving
multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet
order problem.

We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the
mctp_i3c_read function.

According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed
in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be
discarded and wait for the next SOM.
For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM.

Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the
mctp_i3c_read function.  Before the modification, when a command
requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an
error usually occurs within 100 loops.  After the mutex, it can go
through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well.

Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver")
Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
[[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 0e2909c ]

When cmd_alloc_index(), fails cmd_work_handler() needs
to complete ent->slotted before returning early.
Otherwise the task which issued the command may hang:

   mlx5_core 0000:01:00.0: cmd_work_handler:877:(pid 3880418): failed to allocate command entry
   INFO: task kworker/13:2:4055883 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
         Not tainted 4.19.90-25.44.v2101.ky10.aarch64 #1
   "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
   kworker/13:2    D    0 4055883      2 0x00000228
   Workqueue: events mlx5e_tx_dim_work [mlx5_core]
   Call trace:
      __switch_to+0xe8/0x150
      __schedule+0x2a8/0x9b8
      schedule+0x2c/0x88
      schedule_timeout+0x204/0x478
      wait_for_common+0x154/0x250
      wait_for_completion+0x28/0x38
      cmd_exec+0x7a0/0xa00 [mlx5_core]
      mlx5_cmd_exec+0x54/0x80 [mlx5_core]
      mlx5_core_modify_cq+0x6c/0x80 [mlx5_core]
      mlx5_core_modify_cq_moderation+0xa0/0xb8 [mlx5_core]
      mlx5e_tx_dim_work+0x54/0x68 [mlx5_core]
      process_one_work+0x1b0/0x448
      worker_thread+0x54/0x468
      kthread+0x134/0x138
      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Fixes: 485d65e ("net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore")
Signed-off-by: Chenguang Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9ab4981 ]

If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to
do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says,
it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the
_early() suffix.

Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are
initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging:

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged.
	...
	BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
	#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
	#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G     U  W          6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3
	Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
	Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022
	RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe]

This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a
signature failure. There will still be an extra message,

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100

but that's better than a NULL ptr deref.

Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956
Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device")
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 5001ef3)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit d38e26e upstream.

Using the 'net' structure via 'current' is not recommended for different
reasons.

First, if the goal is to use it to read or write per-netns data, this is
inconsistent with how the "generic" sysctl entries are doing: directly
by only using pointers set to the table entry, e.g. table->data. Linked
to that, the per-netns data should always be obtained from the table
linked to the netns it had been created for, which may not coincide with
the reader's or writer's netns.

Another reason is that access to current->nsproxy->netns can oops if
attempted when current->nsproxy had been dropped when the current task
is exiting. This is what syzbot found, when using acct(2):

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5924 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00004-gccb98ccef0e5 #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
  RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
  Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206

  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
  RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
  RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
  R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   proc_sys_call_handler+0x403/0x5d0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
   __kernel_write_iter+0x318/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:612
   __kernel_write+0xf6/0x140 fs/read_write.c:632
   do_acct_process+0xcb0/0x14a0 kernel/acct.c:539
   acct_pin_kill+0x2d/0x100 kernel/acct.c:192
   pin_kill+0x194/0x7c0 fs/fs_pin.c:44
   mnt_pin_kill+0x61/0x1e0 fs/fs_pin.c:81
   cleanup_mnt+0x3ac/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1366
   task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:239
   exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]
   do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938
   do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087
   get_signal+0x2576/0x2610 kernel/signal.c:3017
   arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x90/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x150/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
   do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  RIP: 0033:0x7fee3cb87a6a
  Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fee3cb87a40.
  RSP: 002b:00007fffcccac688 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fffcccac710 RCX: 00007fee3cb87a6a
  RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00007fffcccac6ac R09: 00007fffcccacac7
  R10: 00007fffcccac710 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fee3cd49500
  R13: 00007fffcccac6ac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fee3cd4b000
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
  Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
  RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
  RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
  R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  ----------------
  Code disassembly (best guess), 1 bytes skipped:
     0:	42 80 3c 38 00       	cmpb   $0x0,(%rax,%r15,1)
     5:	0f 85 fe 02 00 00    	jne    0x309
     b:	4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 	mov    0x908(%r12),%r12
    12:	00
    13:	48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 	movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
    1a:	fc ff df
    1d:	49 8d 7c 24 28       	lea    0x28(%r12),%rdi
    22:	48 89 fa             	mov    %rdi,%rdx
    25:	48 c1 ea 03          	shr    $0x3,%rdx
  * 29:	80 3c 02 00          	cmpb   $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction
    2d:	0f 85 cc 02 00 00    	jne    0x2ff
    33:	4d 8b 7c 24 28       	mov    0x28(%r12),%r15
    38:	48                   	rex.W
    39:	8d                   	.byte 0x8d
    3a:	84 24 c8             	test   %ah,(%rax,%rcx,8)

Here with 'net.mptcp.scheduler', the 'net' structure is not really
needed, because the table->data already has a pointer to the current
scheduler, the only thing needed from the per-netns data.
Simply use 'data', instead of getting (most of the time) the same thing,
but from a longer and indirect way.

Fixes: 6963c50 ("mptcp: only allow set existing scheduler for net.mptcp.scheduler")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 0ee4736 upstream.

Since the input data length passed to zlib_compress_folios() can be
arbitrary, always setting strm.avail_in to a multiple of PAGE_SIZE may
cause read-in bytes to exceed the input range. Currently this triggers
an assert in btrfs_compress_folios() on the debug kernel (see below).
Fix strm.avail_in calculation for S390 hardware acceleration path.

  assertion failed: *total_in <= orig_len, in fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041!
  monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 325 Comm: kworker/u273:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-20241204.rc1.git6.fae3b21430ca.300.fc41.s390x+debug #1
  Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 703 (z/VM 7.4.0)
  Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper
  Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 0000021761df6538 (btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0)
             R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
  Krnl GPRS: 0000000080000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000047 0000000000000000
             0000000000000006 ffffff01757bb000 000001976232fcc0 000000000000130c
             000001976232fcd0 000001976232fcc8 00000118ff4a0e30 0000000000000001
             00000111821ab400 0000011100000000 0000021761df6534 000001976232fb58
  Krnl Code: 0000021761df6528: c020006f5ef4        larl    %r2,0000021762be2310
             0000021761df652e: c0e5ffbd09d5        brasl   %r14,00000217615978d8
            #0000021761df6534: af000000            mc      0,0
            >0000021761df6538: 0707                bcr     0,%r7
             0000021761df653a: 0707                bcr     0,%r7
             0000021761df653c: 0707                bcr     0,%r7
             0000021761df653e: 0707                bcr     0,%r7
             0000021761df6540: c004004bb7ec        brcl    0,000002176276d518
  Call Trace:
   [<0000021761df6538>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0
  ([<0000021761df6534>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x194/0x1a0)
   [<0000021761d97788>] compress_file_range+0x3b8/0x6d0
   [<0000021761dcee7c>] btrfs_work_helper+0x10c/0x160
   [<0000021761645760>] process_one_work+0x2b0/0x5d0
   [<000002176164637e>] worker_thread+0x20e/0x3e0
   [<000002176165221a>] kthread+0x15a/0x170
   [<00000217615b859c>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
   [<00000217626e72d2>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  Last Breaking-Event-Address:
   [<0000021761597924>] _printk+0x4c/0x58
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

Fixes: fd1e75d ("btrfs: make compression path to be subpage compatible")
CC: [email protected] # 6.12+
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 6a97f41 upstream.

die() can be called in exception handler, and therefore cannot sleep.
However, die() takes spinlock_t which can sleep with PREEMPT_RT enabled.
That causes the following warning:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 285, name: mutex
preempt_count: 110001, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 285 Comm: mutex Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00022-ge19049cf7d56-dirty torvalds#234
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
    dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24
    show_stack+0x2c/0x38
    dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x72
    dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
    __might_resched+0x130/0x13a
    rt_spin_lock+0x2a/0x5c
    die+0x24/0x112
    do_trap_insn_illegal+0xa0/0xea
    _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xcc/0xd8
Oops - illegal instruction [#1]

Switch to use raw_spinlock_t, which does not sleep even with PREEMPT_RT
enabled.

Fixes: 76d2a04 ("RISC-V: Init and Halt Code")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit eb09fbe ]

syzkaller reported a corrupted list in ieee802154_if_remove. [1]

Remove an IEEE 802.15.4 network interface after unregister an IEEE 802.15.4
hardware device from the system.

CPU0					CPU1
====					====
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit		ieee802154_unregister_hw
ieee802154_del_iface			ieee802154_remove_interfaces
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated	list_del(&sdata->list)
ieee802154_if_remove
list_del_rcu

The net device has been unregistered, since the rcu grace period,
unregistration must be run before ieee802154_if_remove.

To avoid this issue, add a check for local->interfaces before deleting
sdata list.

[1]
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6277 Comm: syz-executor157 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00005-g557329bcecc2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf4/0x140 lib/list_debug.c:56
Code: e8 a1 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 37 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 8f 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 40 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 7d 7e 00 07 90 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 a0 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 6b 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000490f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: d211eee56bb28d00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88805b278dd8 R08: ffffffff8174a12c R09: 1ffffffff2852f0d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff2852f0e R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff88805b278cc0
FS:  0000555572f94380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056262e4a3000 CR3: 0000000078496000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
 list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:157 [inline]
 ieee802154_if_remove+0x86/0x1e0 net/mac802154/iface.c:687
 rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:24 [inline]
 ieee802154_del_iface+0x2c0/0x5c0 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c:323
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:744
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2607
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2661 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x380 net/socket.c:2690
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985f827280dc3a6e7e92
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit f6abafc upstream.

Some of the core functions can only be called if the transport
has been assigned.

As Michal reported, a socket might have the transport at NULL,
for example after a failed connect(), causing the following trace:

    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    PGD 12faf8067 P4D 12faf8067 PUD 113670067 PMD 0
    Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
    CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+
    RIP: 0010:vsock_connectible_has_data+0x1f/0x40
    Call Trace:
     vsock_bpf_recvmsg+0xca/0x5e0
     sock_recvmsg+0xb9/0xc0
     __sys_recvfrom+0xb3/0x130
     __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30
     do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

So we need to check the `vsk->transport` in vsock_bpf_recvmsg(),
especially for connected sockets (stream/seqpacket) as we already
do in __vsock_connectible_recvmsg().

Fixes: 634f1a7 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Tested-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 9860370 upstream.

irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we
must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking.

This fixes the following lockdep splat:

[    5.349336] =============================
[    5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[    5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 Tainted: G        W
[    5.363031] -----------------------------
[    5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock:
[    5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.380079] other info that might help us debug this:
[    5.385138] context-{5:5}
[    5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44:
[    5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204)
[    5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205)
[    5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006)
[    5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596)
[    5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614)
[    5.436472] stack backtrace:
[    5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69
[    5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[    5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[    5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[    5.461699] Call trace:
[    5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C
[    5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[    5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
[    5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176)
[    5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814)
[    5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[    5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345)
[    5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250)
[    5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270)
[    5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807)
[    5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208)

Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 6e64d6b upstream.

In commit e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL
after job completion"), we introduced a change to assign the job pointer
to NULL after completing a job, indicating job completion.

However, this approach created a race condition between the DRM
scheduler workqueue and the IRQ execution thread. As soon as the fence is
signaled in the IRQ execution thread, a new job starts to be executed.
This results in a race condition where the IRQ execution thread sets the
job pointer to NULL simultaneously as the `run_job()` function assigns
a new job to the pointer.

This race condition can lead to a NULL pointer dereference if the IRQ
execution thread sets the job pointer to NULL after `run_job()` assigns
it to the new job. When the new job completes and the GPU emits an
interrupt, `v3d_irq()` is triggered, potentially causing a crash.

[  466.310099] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000c0
[  466.318928] Mem abort info:
[  466.321723]   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[  466.325479]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  466.330807]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  466.333864]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  466.337010]   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[  466.341900] Data abort info:
[  466.344783]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[  466.350285]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[  466.355350]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[  466.360677] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000089772000
[  466.367140] [00000000000000c0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[  466.375875] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  466.382163] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep binfmt_misc vc4 snd_soc_hdmi_codec drm_display_helper cec brcmfmac_wcc spidev rpivid_hevc(C) drm_client_lib brcmfmac hci_uart drm_dma_helper pisp_be btbcm brcmutil snd_soc_core aes_ce_blk v4l2_mem2mem bluetooth aes_ce_cipher snd_compress videobuf2_dma_contig ghash_ce cfg80211 gf128mul snd_pcm_dmaengine videobuf2_memops ecdh_generic sha2_ce ecc videobuf2_v4l2 snd_pcm v3d sha256_arm64 rfkill videodev snd_timer sha1_ce libaes gpu_sched snd videobuf2_common sha1_generic drm_shmem_helper mc rp1_pio drm_kms_helper raspberrypi_hwmon spi_bcm2835 gpio_keys i2c_brcmstb rp1 raspberrypi_gpiomem rp1_mailbox rp1_adc nvmem_rmem uio_pdrv_genirq uio i2c_dev drm ledtrig_pattern drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight fuse dm_mod ip_tables x_tables ipv6
[  466.458429] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2008 Comm: chromium Tainted: G         C         6.13.0-v8+ #18
[  466.467336] Tainted: [C]=CRAP
[  466.470306] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT)
[  466.476157] pstate: 404000c9 (nZcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[  466.483143] pc : v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d]
[  466.487258] lr : __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x228
[  466.492327] sp : ffffffc080003ea0
[  466.495646] x29: ffffffc080003ea0 x28: ffffff80c0c94200 x27: 0000000000000000
[  466.502807] x26: ffffffd08dd81d7b x25: ffffff80c0c94200 x24: ffffff8003bdc200
[  466.509969] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000000000a7 x21: 0000000000000000
[  466.517130] x20: ffffff8041bb0000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
[  466.524291] x17: ffffffafadfb0000 x16: ffffffc080000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[  466.531452] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[  466.538613] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffd08c527eb0
[  466.545777] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[  466.552941] x5 : ffffffd08c4100d0 x4 : ffffffafadfb0000 x3 : ffffffc080003f70
[  466.560102] x2 : ffffffc0829e8058 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000
[  466.567263] Call trace:
[  466.569711]  v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d] (P)
[  466.573826]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x228
[  466.578546]  handle_irq_event+0x54/0xb8
[  466.582391]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xac/0x240
[  466.586498]  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x58
[  466.591128]  gic_handle_irq+0x48/0xd8
[  466.594798]  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58
[  466.598730]  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98
[  466.602923]  el0_interrupt+0x44/0xc0
[  466.606508]  __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x28
[  466.611050]  el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x20
[  466.615156]  el0t_64_irq+0x198/0x1a0
[  466.618740] Code: 52800035 3607faf3 f9442e80 52800021 (f9406018)
[  466.624853] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  466.629483] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
[  466.636384] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[  466.640320] Kernel Offset: 0x100c400000 from 0xffffffc080000000
[  466.646259] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x0
[  466.649141] CPU features: 0x100,00000170,00901250,0200720b
[  466.654644] Memory Limit: none
[  466.657706] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fix the crash by assigning the job pointer to NULL before signaling the
fence. This ensures that the job pointer is cleared before any new job
starts execution, preventing the race condition and the NULL pointer
dereference crash.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL after job completion")
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jose Maria Casanova Crespo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Phil Elwell <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 8f70caa ]

Power Hypervisor can possibily allocate MMIO window intersecting with
Dynamic DMA Window (DDW) range, which is over 32-bit addressing.

These MMIO pages needs to be marked as reserved so that IOMMU doesn't map
DMA buffers in this range.

The current code is not marking these pages correctly which is resulting
in LPAR to OOPS while booting. The stack is at below

BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00800005cd40000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000005cdac
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: af_packet rfkill ibmveth(X) lpfc(+) nvmet_fc nvmet nvme_keyring crct10dif_vpmsum nvme_fc nvme_fabrics nvme_core be2net(+) nvme_auth rtc_generic nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc fuse configfs ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmvfc(X) scsi_transport_fc vmx_crypto gf128mul crc32c_vpmsum dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod sd_mod scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_alua t10_pi crc64_rocksoft_generic crc64_rocksoft sg crc64 scsi_mod
Supported: Yes, External
CPU: 8 PID: 241 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.4.0-150600.23.14-default #1 SLE15-SP6 b44ee71c81261b9e4bab5e0cde1f2ed891d5359b
Hardware name: IBM,9080-M9S POWER9 (raw) 0x4e2103 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.B0 (VH950_149) hv:phyp pSeries
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
NIP:  c00000000005cdac LR: c00000000005e830 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00001400c9ff770 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.4.0-150600.23.14-default)
MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24228448  XER: 00000001
CFAR: c00000000005cdd4 DAR: c00800005cd40000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000005e830 c00001400c9ffa10 c000000001987d00 c00001400c4fe800
GPR04: 0000080000000000 0000000000000001 0000000004000000 0000000000800000
GPR08: 0000000004000000 0000000000000001 c00800005cd40000 ffffffffffffffff
GPR12: 0000000084228882 c00000000a4c4f00 0000000000000010 0000080000000000
GPR16: c00001400c4fe800 0000000004000000 0800000000000000 c00000006088b800
GPR20: c00001401a7be980 c00001400eff3800 c000000002a2da68 000000000000002b
GPR24: c0000000026793a8 c000000002679368 000000000000002a c0000000026793c8
GPR28: 000008007effffff 0000080000000000 0000000000800000 c00001400c4fe800
NIP [c00000000005cdac] iommu_table_reserve_pages+0xac/0x100
LR [c00000000005e830] iommu_init_table+0x80/0x1e0
Call Trace:
[c00001400c9ffa10] [c00000000005e810] iommu_init_table+0x60/0x1e0 (unreliable)
[c00001400c9ffa90] [c00000000010356c] iommu_bypass_supported_pSeriesLP+0x9cc/0xe40
[c00001400c9ffc30] [c00000000005c300] dma_iommu_dma_supported+0xf0/0x230
[c00001400c9ffcb0] [c00000000024b0c4] dma_supported+0x44/0x90
[c00001400c9ffcd0] [c00000000024b14c] dma_set_mask+0x3c/0x80
[c00001400c9ffd00] [c0080000555b715c] be_probe+0xc4/0xb90 [be2net]
[c00001400c9ffdc0] [c000000000986f3c] local_pci_probe+0x6c/0x110
[c00001400c9ffe40] [c000000000188f28] work_for_cpu_fn+0x38/0x60
[c00001400c9ffe70] [c00000000018e454] process_one_work+0x314/0x620
[c00001400c9fff10] [c00000000018f280] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x620
[c00001400c9fff90] [c00000000019bb18] kthread+0x148/0x150
[c00001400c9fffe0] [c00000000000ded8] start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18

There are 2 issues in the code

1. The index is "int" while the address is "unsigned long". This results in
   negative value when setting the bitmap.

2. The DMA offset is page shifted but the MMIO range is used as-is (64-bit
   address). MMIO address needs to be page shifted as well.

Fixes: 3c33066 ("powerpc/kernel/iommu: Add new iommu_table_in_use() helper")

Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit c0def46 ]

[WARNING]
There are several warnings about the recently introduced qgroup
auto-removal that it triggers WARN_ON() for the non-zero rfer/excl
numbers, e.g:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 67 PID: 2882 at fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:1854 btrfs_remove_qgroup+0x3df/0x450
 CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 2882 Comm: btrfs-cleaner Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.6-300.fc41.x86_64 #1
 RIP: 0010:btrfs_remove_qgroup+0x3df/0x450
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  btrfs_qgroup_cleanup_dropped_subvolume+0x97/0xc0
  btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x44e/0xa80
  btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xc3/0x110
  cleaner_kthread+0xd8/0x130
  kthread+0xd2/0x100
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 BTRFS warning (device sda): to be deleted qgroup 0/319 has non-zero numbers, rfer 258478080 rfer_cmpr 258478080 excl 0 excl_cmpr 0

[CAUSE]
Although the root cause is still unclear, as if qgroup is consistent a
fully dropped subvolume (with extra transaction committed) should lead
to all zero numbers for the qgroup.

My current guess is the subvolume drop triggered the new subtree drop
threshold thus marked qgroup inconsistent, then rescan cleared it but
some corner case is not properly handled during subvolume dropping.

But at least for this particular case, since it's only the rfer/excl not
properly reset to 0, and qgroup is already marked inconsistent, there is
nothing to be worried for the end users.

The user space tool utilizing qgroup would queue a rescan to handle
everything, so the kernel wanring is a little overkilled.

[ENHANCEMENT]
Enhance the warning inside btrfs_remove_qgroup() by:

- Only do WARN() if CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is enabled
  As explained the kernel can handle inconsistent qgroups by simply do a
  rescan, there is nothing to bother the end users.

- Treat the reserved space leak the same as non-zero numbers
  By outputting the values and trigger a WARN() if it's a debug build.
  So far I haven't experienced any case related to reserved space so I
  hope we will never need to bother them.

Fixes: 839d6ea ("btrfs: automatically remove the subvolume qgroup")
Link: kdave/btrfs-progs#922
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1068568 ]

The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.

This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
  ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
  sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
  sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
  sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
  sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
  qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
  tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
  qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
  dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
  netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
  dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
  __dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
  dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
  unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
  unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
  __tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
  tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
  tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
  __fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
  task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
  do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
  do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270

The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):

tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1

Scenario that triggers the crash:

* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1

* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
  gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
  it schedules itself for later.

* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
  qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
  by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
  however q->tail is not NULL.

At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.

Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 95fc45d ]

syzbot found a lockdep issue [1].

We should remove ax25 RTNL dependency in ax25_setsockopt()

This should also fix a variety of possible UAF in ax25.

[1]

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.5.1818/12806 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff8fcb3988 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
 ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0x209/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:574

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
        lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3642
        lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
        ax25_kill_by_device net/ax25/af_ax25.c:101 [inline]
        ax25_device_event+0x24d/0x580 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:146
        notifier_call_chain+0x1a5/0x3f0 kernel/notifier.c:85
       __dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400
        dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:9026
        dev_ifsioc+0x7c8/0xe70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:563
        dev_ioctl+0x719/0x1340 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:820
        sock_do_ioctl+0x240/0x460 net/socket.c:1234
        sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1339
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
        __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
        __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
        __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0xee0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735
        ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680
        do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2324
        __sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2349 [inline]
        __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2355 [inline]
        __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2352 [inline]
        __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1ee/0x280 net/socket.c:2352
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(sk_lock-AF_AX25);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(sk_lock-AF_AX25);
  lock(rtnl_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz.5.1818/12806:
  #0: ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
  #0: ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0x209/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:574

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12806 Comm: syz.5.1818 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
  print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
  check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
  __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
  lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
  __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
  __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0xee0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735
  ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2324
  __sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2349 [inline]
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2355 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2352 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1ee/0x280 net/socket.c:2352
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7b62385d29

Fixes: c433570 ("ax25: fix a use-after-free in ax25_fillin_cb()")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 2f76676 ]

If WoWLAN failed in resume flow, the rtw89_ops_add_interface() triggered
without removing the interface first. Then the mgnt_entry list init again,
causing the list_empty() check in rtw89_chanctx_ops_assign_vif()
useless, and list_add_tail() again. Therefore, we have added a check to
prevent double adding of the list.

rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: failed to check wow status disabled
rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: wow: failed to check disable fw ready
rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: wow: failed to swap to normal fw
rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: failed to disable wow
rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: failed to resume for wow -110
rtw89_8852ce 0000:01:00.0: MAC has already powered on
i2c_hid_acpi i2c-ILTK0001:00: PM: acpi_subsys_resume+0x0/0x60 returned 0 after 284705 usecs
list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff9d9719d82228), but was ffff9d9719f96030. (prev=ffff9d9719f96030).
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:34!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 6918 Comm: kworker/u8:19 Tainted: G     U     O
Hardware name: Google Anraggar/Anraggar, BIOS Google_Anraggar.15217.514.0 03/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9f/0xb0
Code: e8 56 89 ff ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 3e fc e0 96 48 89 c6 e8 45 89 ff ...
RSP: 0018:ffffa51b42bbbaf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffff9d9719d82ab0 RCX: 13acb86e047a4400
RDX: 3fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffdfff
RBP: ffffa51b42bbbb28 R08: ffffffff9768e250 R09: 0000000000001fff
R10: ffffffff9765e250 R11: 0000000000005ffd R12: ffff9d9719f95c40
R13: ffff9d9719f95be8 R14: ffff9d97081bfd78 R15: ffff9d9719d82060
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d9a6fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007e7d029a4060 CR3: 0000000345e38000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
 ? die+0xaa/0xd0
 ? do_trap+0x9f/0x170
 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9f/0xb0
 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9f/0xb0
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x69/0x90
 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9f/0xb0
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9f/0xb0
 rtw89_chanctx_ops_assign_vif+0x1f9/0x210 [rtw89_core cbb375c44bf28564ce479002bff66617a25d9ac1]
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa0/0xf0
 rtw89_ops_assign_vif_chanctx+0x4b/0x90 [rtw89_core cbb375c44bf28564ce479002bff66617a25d9ac1]
 drv_assign_vif_chanctx+0xa7/0x1f0 [mac80211 6efaad16237edaaea0868b132d4f93ecf918a8b6]
 ieee80211_reconfig+0x9cb/0x17b0 [mac80211 6efaad16237edaaea0868b132d4f93ecf918a8b6]
 ? __pfx_wiphy_resume+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 572d03acaaa933fe38251be7fce3b3675284b8ed]
 ? dev_printk_emit+0x51/0x70
 ? _dev_info+0x6e/0x90
 wiphy_resume+0x89/0x180 [cfg80211 572d03acaaa933fe38251be7fce3b3675284b8ed]
 ? __pfx_wiphy_resume+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 572d03acaaa933fe38251be7fce3b3675284b8ed]
 dpm_run_callback+0x37/0x1e0
 device_resume+0x26d/0x4b0
 ? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10
 async_resume+0x1d/0x30
 async_run_entry_fn+0x29/0xd0
 worker_thread+0x397/0x970
 kthread+0xed/0x110
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
 </TASK>

Fixes: 68ec751 ("wifi: rtw89: chan: manage active interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit be7a6a7 ]

It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:

Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
 ? die+0x2e/0x50
 ? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
 seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
 proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
 ? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
 vfs_read+0x469/0x570
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.

Cc: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Talpey <[email protected]>
Fixes: a6d8fb5 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed")
Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jay Shin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 58f038e ]

During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated
htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The
reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has
already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()
returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,
the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the
freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the
old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may
acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller
has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning
will be reported when such race happens:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003
  3 locks held by test_progs/676:
  #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830
  #1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500
  #2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  Preemption disabled at:
  [<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ #11
  Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...
  Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170
  __schedule+0x300c/0x4800
  schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60
  rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0
  rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230
  hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30
  bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40
  bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80
  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0
  check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280
  htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500
  bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43
  bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e
  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830
  __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0
  x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  ...
  </TASK>

It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems
into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket
lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after
the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent
overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when
the map is full.

Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling
of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:
1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value
2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to
   cancel it again
Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try
to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is
running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has
downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is
delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable
(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in
locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if
necessary.

It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the
problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the
softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced
in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra
depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.

Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 600258d ]

Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM
core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed
at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack.

However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward),
that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered
to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set.

The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case:

 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up
 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up
 Initializing XFRM netlink socket
 IPsec XFRM device driver
 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  ? show_regs+0x63/0x70
  ? __die_body+0x20/0x60
  ? __die+0x2b/0x40
  ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
  mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core]
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0
  sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70
  ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0
  neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0
  __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50
  neigh_update+0x14/0x20
  arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0
  ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70
  arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0
  ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0
  napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0
  mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core]
  __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0
  net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370
  ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50
  ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core]
  handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0
  ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60
  irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100
  common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0
  </IRQ>
  <TASK>
  asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40
 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22
 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb
40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8
 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680
 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4
 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70
 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8
  ? default_idle+0x9/0x20
  arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10
  default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0
  do_idle+0x1f2/0x240
  cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30
  rest_init+0xe7/0x100
  start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90
  x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
  x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110
  ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130
  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface
xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc
intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw
qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc
scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456
async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx
libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3
sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample
virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
 Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 396f016 ]

Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load #1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load #2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load #2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load #2 is not
executed until load #1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ]

libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit b32c369 ]

In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit d3d9304 upstream.

Prevent double queueing of implicit ODP mr destroy work by using
__xa_cmpxchg() to make sure this is the only time we are destroying this
specific mr.

Without this change, we could try to invalidate this mr twice, which in
turn could result in queuing a MR work destroy twice, and eventually the
second work could execute after the MR was freed due to the first work,
causing a user after free and trace below.

   refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
   WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12178 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
   Modules linked in: bonding ib_ipoib vfio_pci ip_gre geneve nf_tables ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ipip tunnel4 ib_umad rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 mlx5_ib vfio ib_uverbs mlx5_core iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
   CPU: 2 PID: 12178 Comm: kworker/u20:5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1_net_next_mlx5_58c644e #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
   Workqueue: events_unbound free_implicit_child_mr_work [mlx5_ib]
   RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
   Code: 48 c7 c7 38 95 2a 82 c6 05 bc c6 fe 00 01 e8 0c 66 aa ff 0f 0b 5b c3 48 c7 c7 e0 94 2a 82 c6 05 a7 c6 fe 00 01 e8 f5 65 aa ff <0f> 0b 5b c3 90 8b 07 3d 00 00 00 c0 74 12 83 f8 01 74 13 8d 50 ff
   RSP: 0018:ffff8881008e3e40 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
   RDX: ffff88852c91b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88852c91b5c0
   RBP: ffff8881dacd4e00 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000019
   R10: 000000000000072e R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffff88812bfd9e00
   R13: ffff8881c792d200 R14: ffff88810011c005 R15: ffff8881002099c0
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007f5694b5e000 CR3: 00000001153f6003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
    free_implicit_child_mr_work+0x180/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
    process_one_work+0x1cc/0x3c0
    worker_thread+0x218/0x3c0
    kthread+0xc6/0xf0
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
    </TASK>

Fixes: 5256edc ("RDMA/mlx5: Rework implicit ODP destroy")
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/c96b8645a81085abff739e6b06e286a350d1283d.1737274283.git.leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit c79a39d upstream.

On a board running ntpd and gpsd, I'm seeing a consistent use-after-free
in sys_exit() from gpsd when rebooting:

    pps pps1: removed
    ------------[ cut here ]------------
    kobject: '(null)' (00000000db4bec24): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
    WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 440 at lib/kobject.c:734 kobject_put+0x120/0x150
    CPU: 2 UID: 299 PID: 440 Comm: gpsd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-00308-gb31c44928842 #1
    Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.1 (DT)
    pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
    pc : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
    lr : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
    sp : ffffffc0803d3ae0
    x29: ffffffc0803d3ae0 x28: ffffff8042dc9738 x27: 0000000000000001
    x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff8042dc9040 x24: ffffff8042dc9440
    x23: ffffff80402a4620 x22: ffffff8042ef4bd0 x21: ffffff80405cb600
    x20: 000000000008001b x19: ffffff8040b3b6e0 x18: 0000000000000000
    x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 696e6920746f6e20
    x14: 7369203a29343263 x13: 205d303434542020 x12: 0000000000000000
    x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
    x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
    x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
    x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
    Call trace:
     kobject_put+0x120/0x150
     cdev_put+0x20/0x3c
     __fput+0x2c4/0x2d8
     ____fput+0x1c/0x38
     task_work_run+0x70/0xfc
     do_exit+0x2a0/0x924
     do_group_exit+0x34/0x90
     get_signal+0x7fc/0x8c0
     do_signal+0x128/0x13b4
     do_notify_resume+0xdc/0x160
     el0_svc+0xd4/0xf8
     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x140/0x14c
     el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

...followed by more symptoms of corruption, with similar stacks:

    refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
    kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception

This happens because pps_device_destruct() frees the pps_device with the
embedded cdev immediately after calling cdev_del(), but, as the comment
above cdev_del() notes, fops for previously opened cdevs are still
callable even after cdev_del() returns. I think this bug has always
been there: I can't explain why it suddenly started happening every time
I reboot this particular board.

In commit d953e0e ("pps: Fix a use-after free bug when
unregistering a source."), George Spelvin suggested removing the
embedded cdev. That seems like the simplest way to fix this, so I've
implemented his suggestion, using __register_chrdev() with pps_idr
becoming the source of truth for which minor corresponds to which
device.

But now that pps_idr defines userspace visibility instead of cdev_add(),
we need to be sure the pps->dev refcount can't reach zero while
userspace can still find it again. So, the idr_remove() call moves to
pps_unregister_cdev(), and pps_idr now holds a reference to pps->dev.

    pps_core: source serial1 got cdev (251:1)
    <...>
    pps pps1: removed
    pps_core: unregistering pps1
    pps_core: deallocating pps1

Fixes: d953e0e ("pps: Fix a use-after free bug when unregistering a source.")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a17975fd5ae99385791929e563f72564edbcf28f.1731383727.git.calvin@wbinvd.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit ee1b504 upstream.

The following kernel oops is thrown when trying to remove the max96712
module:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00007375746174db
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x0000000096000004
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
  CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
  GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000010af89000
[00007375746174db] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: crct10dif_ce polyval_ce mxc_jpeg_encdec flexcan
    snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card snd_soc_fsl_micfil dwc_mipi_csi2
    imx_csi_formatter polyval_generic v4l2_jpeg imx_pcm_dma can_dev
    snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_wm8962 snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_fsl_utils
    max96712(C-) rpmsg_ctrl rpmsg_char pwm_fan fuse
    [last unloaded: imx8_isi]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 754 Comm: rmmod
	    Tainted: G         C    6.12.0-rc6-06364-g327fec852c31 #17
Tainted: [C]=CRAP
Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : led_put+0x1c/0x40
lr : v4l2_subdev_put_privacy_led+0x48/0x58
sp : ffff80008699bbb0
x29: ffff80008699bbb0 x28: ffff00008ac233c0 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff000080cf1170 x22: ffff00008b53bd00 x21: ffff8000822ad1c8
x20: ffff000080ff5c00 x19: ffff00008b53be40 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffff0000800f8010 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff000082acf5c0 x10: ffff000082acf478 x9 : ffff0000800f8010
x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : fefefeff6364626d
x5 : 8080808000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 00000000553a3dc1
x2 : ffff00008ac233c0 x1 : ffff00008ac233c0 x0 : ff00737574617473
Call trace:
 led_put+0x1c/0x40
 v4l2_subdev_put_privacy_led+0x48/0x58
 v4l2_async_unregister_subdev+0x2c/0x1a4
 max96712_remove+0x1c/0x38 [max96712]
 i2c_device_remove+0x2c/0x9c
 device_remove+0x4c/0x80
 device_release_driver_internal+0x1cc/0x228
 driver_detach+0x4c/0x98
 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
 driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
 i2c_del_driver+0x54/0x64
 max96712_i2c_driver_exit+0x18/0x1d0 [max96712]
 __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1a4/0x290
 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
 el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: f9000bf3 aa0003f3 f9402800 f9402000 (f9403400)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This happens because in v4l2_i2c_subdev_init(), the i2c_set_cliendata()
is called again and the data is overwritten to point to sd, instead of
priv. So, in remove(), the wrong pointer is passed to
v4l2_async_unregister_subdev(), leading to a crash.

Fixes: 5814f32 ("media: staging: max96712: Add basic support for MAX96712 GMSL2 deserializer")
Signed-off-by: Laurentiu Palcu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 17391cb upstream.

On pSeries, when user attempts to use the same vfio container used by
different iommu group, the spapr_tce_set_window() returns -EPERM
and the subsequent cleanup leads to the below crash.

   Kernel attempted to read user page (308) - exploit attempt?
   BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000308
   Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001ce358
   Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
   NIP:  c0000000001ce358 LR: c0000000001ce05c CTR: c00000000005add0
   <snip>
   NIP [c0000000001ce358] spapr_tce_unset_window+0x3b8/0x510
   LR [c0000000001ce05c] spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510
   Call Trace:
     spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510 (unreliable)
     tce_iommu_attach_group+0x24c/0x340 [vfio_iommu_spapr_tce]
     vfio_container_attach_group+0xec/0x240 [vfio]
     vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x548/0xb00 [vfio]
     sys_ioctl+0x754/0x1580
     system_call_exception+0x13c/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
   <snip>
   --- interrupt: 3000

Fix this by having null check for the tbl passed to the
spapr_tce_unset_window().

Fixes: f431a8c ("powerpc/iommu: Reimplement the iommu_table_group_ops for pSeries")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Vaishnavi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 22293c3 upstream.

On RZ/Five, which is non-coherent, and uses CONFIG_DMA_GLOBAL_POOL=y:

    Oops - store (or AMO) access fault [#1]
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00015-g8a6e02d0c00e torvalds#201
    Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g043f01 (DT)
    epc : __memset+0x60/0x100
     ra : __dma_alloc_from_coherent+0x150/0x17a
    epc : ffffffff8062d2bc ra : ffffffff80053a94 sp : ffffffc60000ba20
     gp : ffffffff812e9938 tp : ffffffd601920000 t0 : ffffffc6000d0000
     t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : ffffffffe9600000 s0 : ffffffc60000baa0
     s1 : ffffffc6000d0000 a0 : ffffffc6000d0000 a1 : 0000000000000000
     a2 : 0000000000001000 a3 : ffffffc6000d1000 a4 : 0000000000000000
     a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffd601adacc0 a7 : ffffffd601a841a8
     s2 : ffffffd6018573c0 s3 : 0000000000001000 s4 : ffffffd6019541e0
     s5 : 0000000200000022 s6 : ffffffd6018f8410 s7 : ffffffd6018573e8
     s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 0000000000000001 s10: 0000000000000010
     s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : ffffffffdefe62d1
     t5 : 000000001cd6a3a9 t6 : ffffffd601b2aad6
    status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffc6000d0000 cause: 0000000000000007
    [<ffffffff8062d2bc>] __memset+0x60/0x100
    [<ffffffff80053e1a>] dma_alloc_from_global_coherent+0x1c/0x28
    [<ffffffff80053056>] dma_direct_alloc+0x98/0x112
    [<ffffffff8005238c>] dma_alloc_attrs+0x78/0x86
    [<ffffffff8035fdb4>] rz_dmac_probe+0x3f6/0x50a
    [<ffffffff803a0694>] platform_probe+0x4c/0x8a

If CONFIG_DMA_GLOBAL_POOL=y, the reserved_mem structure passed to
rmem_dma_setup() is saved for later use, by saving the passed pointer.
However, when dma_init_reserved_memory() is called later, the pointer
has become stale, causing a crash.

E.g. in the RZ/Five case, the referenced memory now contains the
reserved_mem structure for the "mmode_resv0@30000" node (with base
0x30000 and size 0x10000), instead of the correct "pma_resv0@58000000"
node (with base 0x58000000 and size 0x8000000).

Fix this by saving the needed reserved_mem structure's contents instead.

Fixes: 8a6e02d ("of: reserved_mem: Restructure how the reserved memory regions are processed")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oreoluwa Babatunde <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 9d287e7 upstream.

Error handling is missing when call to nla_put_u32() fails.
Handle the error when the call to nla_put_u32() returns an error.

The error was reported by Coverity Scan.
Report:
CID 1601525: (#1 of 1): Unused value (UNUSED_VALUE)
returned_value: Assigning value from nla_put_u32(skb, XFRMA_SA_PCPU, x->pcpu_num)
to err here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used

Fixes: 1ddf991 ("xfrm: Add support for per cpu xfrm state handling.")
Signed-off-by: Everest K.C. <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit c2b47df upstream.

[BUG]
With CONFIG_DEBUG_VM set, test case generic/476 has some chance to crash
with the following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO():

  BTRFS error (device dm-3): cow_file_range failed, start 1146880 end 1253375 len 106496 ret -28
  BTRFS error (device dm-3): run_delalloc_nocow failed, start 1146880 end 1253375 len 106496 ret -28
  page: refcount:4 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000592787cc index:0x12 pfn:0x10664
  aops:btrfs_aops [btrfs] ino:101 dentry name(?):"f1774"
  flags: 0x2fffff80004028(uptodate|lru|private|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
  page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio))
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2992!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3943513 Comm: kworker/u24:15 Tainted: G           OE      6.12.0-rc7-custom+ torvalds#87
  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
  pc : folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
  lr : folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
  Call trace:
   folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
   btrfs_folio_clamp_clear_dirty+0x80/0xd0 [btrfs]
   __process_folios_contig+0x154/0x268 [btrfs]
   extent_clear_unlock_delalloc+0x5c/0x80 [btrfs]
   run_delalloc_nocow+0x5f8/0x760 [btrfs]
   btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xa8/0x220 [btrfs]
   writepage_delalloc+0x230/0x4c8 [btrfs]
   extent_writepage+0xb8/0x358 [btrfs]
   extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x4e8 [btrfs]
   btrfs_writepages+0x94/0x150 [btrfs]
   do_writepages+0x74/0x190
   filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x88/0xc8
   start_delalloc_inodes+0x178/0x3a8 [btrfs]
   btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x174/0x280 [btrfs]
   shrink_delalloc+0x114/0x280 [btrfs]
   flush_space+0x250/0x2f8 [btrfs]
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x180/0x228 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x164/0x408
   worker_thread+0x25c/0x388
   kthread+0x100/0x118
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  Code: 910a8021 a90363f7 a9046bf9 94012379 (d4210000)
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

[CAUSE]
The first two lines of extra debug messages show the problem is caused
by the error handling of run_delalloc_nocow().

E.g. we have the following dirtied range (4K blocksize 4K page size):

    0                 16K                  32K
    |//////////////////////////////////////|
    |  Pre-allocated  |

And the range [0, 16K) has a preallocated extent.

- Enter run_delalloc_nocow() for range [0, 16K)
  Which found range [0, 16K) is preallocated, can do the proper NOCOW
  write.

- Enter fallback_to_fow() for range [16K, 32K)
  Since the range [16K, 32K) is not backed by preallocated extent, we
  have to go COW.

- cow_file_range() failed for range [16K, 32K)
  So cow_file_range() will do the clean up by clearing folio dirty,
  unlock the folios.

  Now the folios in range [16K, 32K) is unlocked.

- Enter extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() from run_delalloc_nocow()
  Which is called with PAGE_START_WRITEBACK to start page writeback.
  But folios can only be marked writeback when it's properly locked,
  thus this triggered the VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO().

Furthermore there is another hidden but common bug that
run_delalloc_nocow() is not clearing the folio dirty flags in its error
handling path.
This is the common bug shared between run_delalloc_nocow() and
cow_file_range().

[FIX]
- Clear folio dirty for range [@start, @cur_offset)
  Introduce a helper, cleanup_dirty_folios(), which
  will find and lock the folio in the range, clear the dirty flag and
  start/end the writeback, with the extra handling for the
  @locked_folio.

- Introduce a helper to clear folio dirty, start and end writeback

- Introduce a helper to record the last failed COW range end
  This is to trace which range we should skip, to avoid double
  unlocking.

- Skip the failed COW range for the error handling

CC: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
…saction abort

[ Upstream commit 0d85f5c ]

If while we are doing a direct IO write a transaction abort happens, we
mark all existing ordered extents with the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag (done
at btrfs_destroy_ordered_extents()), and then after that if we enter
btrfs_split_ordered_extent() and the ordered extent has bytes left
(meaning we have a bio that doesn't cover the whole ordered extent, see
details at btrfs_extract_ordered_extent()), we will fail on the following
assertion at btrfs_split_ordered_extent():

   ASSERT(!(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS));

because the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag is set and the definition of
BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS is just the union of all flags that identify the
type of write (regular, nocow, prealloc, compressed, direct IO, encoded).

Fix this by returning an error from btrfs_extract_ordered_extent() if we
find the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag in the ordered extent. The error will
be the error that resulted in the transaction abort or -EIO if no
transaction abort happened.

This was recently reported by syzbot with the following trace:

   FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
   name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:53 [inline]
    should_fail_ex+0x3b0/0x4e0 lib/fault-inject.c:154
    should_failslab+0xac/0x100 mm/failslab.c:46
    slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4072 [inline]
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4148 [inline]
    __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline]
    __kmalloc_noprof+0xdd/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4310
    kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
    kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
    btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item+0x244/0x1100 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5742
    reserve_chunk_space+0x1ca/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4292
    check_system_chunk fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4319 [inline]
    do_chunk_alloc fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3891 [inline]
    btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x77b/0xf80 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4187
    find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4166 [inline]
    find_free_extent+0x42d1/0x5810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4579
    btrfs_reserve_extent+0x422/0x810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4672
    btrfs_new_extent_direct fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:186 [inline]
    btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write+0x706/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:321
    btrfs_dio_iomap_begin+0xbb7/0x1180 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:525
    iomap_iter+0x697/0xf60 fs/iomap/iter.c:90
    __iomap_dio_rw+0xeb9/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:702
    btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline]
    btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397
    do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880
    vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050
    do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline]
    __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline]
    __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29
   RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
   R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328
    </TASK>
   BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -12)
   BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item:5745: errno=-12 Out of memory
   BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): forced readonly
   assertion failed: !(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234!
   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
   RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4
   R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401
   R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000
   FS:  00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    btrfs_extract_ordered_extent fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:702 [inline]
    btrfs_dio_submit_io+0x4be/0x6d0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:737
    iomap_dio_submit_bio fs/iomap/direct-io.c:85 [inline]
    iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x1022/0x1740 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:447
    __iomap_dio_rw+0x13b7/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:703
    btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline]
    btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397
    do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880
    vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050
    do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline]
    __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline]
    __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29
   RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
   R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328
    </TASK>
   Modules linked in:
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
   RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4
   R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401
   R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000
   FS:  00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

In this case the transaction abort was due to (an injected) memory
allocation failure when attempting to allocate a new chunk.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 52b1fdc ("btrfs: handle completed ordered extents in btrfs_split_ordered_extent")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 8d9beb4 ]

A GSP event message consists three parts: message header, RPC header,
message body. GSP calculates the number of pages to write from the
total size of a GSP message. This behavior can be observed from the
movement of the write pointer.

However, nvkm takes only the size of RPC header and message body as
the message size when advancing the read pointer. When handling a
two-page GSP message in the non rollback case, It wrongly takes the
message body of the previous message as the message header of the next
message. As the "message length" tends to be zero, in the calculation of
size needs to be copied (0 - size of (message header)), the size needs to
be copied will be "0xffffffxx". It also triggers a kernel panic due to a
NULL pointer error.

[  547.614102] msg: 00000f90: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 d7 18 fb 8b 00 00 00  ........@.......
[  547.622533] msg: 00000fa0: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00  ................
[  547.630965] msg: 00000fb0: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ................
[  547.639397] msg: 00000fc0: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ................
[  547.647832] nvkm 0000:c1:00.0: gsp: peek msg rpc fn:0 len:0x0/0xffffffffffffffe0
[  547.655225] nvkm 0000:c1:00.0: gsp: get msg rpc fn:0 len:0x0/0xffffffffffffffe0
[  547.662532] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
[  547.669485] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  547.674624] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  547.679755] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  547.682294] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  547.686643] CPU: 22 PID: 322 Comm: kworker/22:1 Tainted: G            E      6.9.0-rc6+ #1
[  547.694893] Hardware name: ASRockRack 1U1G-MILAN/N/ROMED8-NL, BIOS L3.12E 09/06/2022
[  547.702626] Workqueue: events r535_gsp_msgq_work [nvkm]
[  547.707921] RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x87/0x230 [nvkm]
[  547.713375] Code: 00 8b 70 08 48 89 e1 31 d2 4c 89 f7 e8 12 f5 ff ff 48 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 48 81 fd 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 c4 00 00 00 <8b> 55 10 41 8b 46 30 85 d2 0f 85 f6 00 00 00 83 f8 04 76 10 ba 05
[  547.732119] RSP: 0018:ffffabe440f87e10 EFLAGS: 00010203
[  547.737335] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 000000000000003f
[  547.744461] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffabe4480a8030 RDI: 0000000000000010
[  547.751585] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffabe440f87bb0
[  547.758707] R10: ffffabe440f87dc8 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000
[  547.765834] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9351df1e5000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  547.772958] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93708eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  547.781035] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  547.786771] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000003cc220002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  547.793896] PKRU: 55555554
[  547.796600] Call Trace:
[  547.799046]  <TASK>
[  547.801152]  ? __die+0x20/0x70
[  547.804211]  ? page_fault_oops+0x75/0x170
[  547.808221]  ? print_hex_dump+0x100/0x160
[  547.812226]  ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x150
[  547.816152]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[  547.820341]  ? r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x87/0x230 [nvkm]
[  547.825184]  r535_gsp_msgq_work+0x42/0x50 [nvkm]
[  547.829845]  process_one_work+0x196/0x3d0
[  547.833861]  worker_thread+0x2fc/0x410
[  547.837613]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  547.841885]  kthread+0xdf/0x110
[  547.845031]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  547.848775]  ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[  547.852354]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  547.856097]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  547.860019]  </TASK>
[  547.862208] Modules linked in: nvkm(E) gsp_log(E) snd_seq_dummy(E) snd_hrtimer(E) snd_seq(E) snd_timer(E) snd_seq_device(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) rfkill(E) qrtr(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ipmi_ssif(E) amd_atl(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) amd64_edac(E) mlx5_ib(E) edac_mce_amd(E) kvm_amd(E) ib_uverbs(E) kvm(E) ib_core(E) acpi_ipmi(E) ipmi_si(E) ipmi_devintf(E) mxm_wmi(E) joydev(E) rapl(E) ptdma(E) i2c_piix4(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) wmi_bmof(E) pcspkr(E) k10temp(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) ast(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) drm_shmem_helper(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) drm_kms_helper(E) ahci(E) crc32_pclmul(E) nvme_tcp(E) libahci(E) nvme(E) crc32c_intel(E) nvme_fabrics(E) cdc_ether(E) nvme_core(E) usbnet(E) mlx5_core(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) drm(E) libata(E) ccp(E) mii(E) t10_pi(E) mlxfw(E) sp5100_tco(E) psample(E) pci_hyperv_intf(E) wmi(E) dm_multipath(E) sunrpc(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E) be2iscsi(E) bnx2i(E) cnic(E) uio(E) cxgb4i(E) cxgb4(E) tls(E) libcxgbi(E) libcxgb(E) qla4xxx(E)
[  547.862283]  iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) iscsi_tcp(E) libiscsi_tcp(E) libiscsi(E) scsi_transport_iscsi(E) fuse(E) [last unloaded: gsp_log(E)]
[  547.962691] CR2: 0000000000000020
[  547.966003] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  549.012012] clocksource: Long readout interval, skipping watchdog check: cs_nsec: 1370499158 wd_nsec: 1370498904
[  549.043676] pstore: backend (erst) writing error (-28)
[  549.050924] RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x87/0x230 [nvkm]
[  549.056389] Code: 00 8b 70 08 48 89 e1 31 d2 4c 89 f7 e8 12 f5 ff ff 48 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 48 81 fd 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 c4 00 00 00 <8b> 55 10 41 8b 46 30 85 d2 0f 85 f6 00 00 00 83 f8 04 76 10 ba 05
[  549.075138] RSP: 0018:ffffabe440f87e10 EFLAGS: 00010203
[  549.080361] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 000000000000003f
[  549.087484] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffabe4480a8030 RDI: 0000000000000010
[  549.094609] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffabe440f87bb0
[  549.101733] R10: ffffabe440f87dc8 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000
[  549.108857] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9351df1e5000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  549.115982] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93708eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  549.124061] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  549.129807] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000003cc220002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  549.136940] PKRU: 55555554
[  549.139653] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[  549.145054] Kernel Offset: 0x18c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[  549.165074] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Also, nvkm wrongly advances the read pointer when handling a two-page GSP
message in the rollback case. In the rollback case, the GSP message will
be copied in two rounds. When handling a two-page GSP message, nvkm first
copies amount of (GSP_PAGE_SIZE - header) data into the buffer, then
advances the read pointer by the result of DIV_ROUND_UP(size,
GSP_PAGE_SIZE). Thus, the read pointer is advanced by 1.

Next, nvkm copies the amount of (total size - (GSP_PAGE_SIZE -
header)) data into the buffer. The left amount of the data will be always
larger than one page since the message header is not taken into account
in the first copy. Thus, the read pointer is advanced by DIV_ROUND_UP(
size(larger than one page), GSP_PAGE_SIZE) = 2.

In the end, the read pointer is wrongly advanced by 3 when handling a
two-page GSP message in the rollback case.

Fix the problems by taking the total size of the message into account
when advancing the read pointer and calculate the read pointer in the end
of the all copies for the rollback case.

BTW: the two-page GSP message can be observed in the msgq when vGPU is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Zhi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 01ed662 ]

r535_gsp_cmdq_push() waits for the available page in the GSP cmdq
buffer when handling a large RPC request. When it sees at least one
available page in the cmdq, it quits the waiting with the amount of
free buffer pages in the queue.

Unfortunately, it always takes the [write pointer, buf_size) as
available buffer pages before rolling back and wrongly calculates the
size of the data should be copied. Thus, it can overwrite the RPC
request that GSP is currently reading, which causes GSP hang due
to corrupted RPC request:

[  549.209389] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  549.214010] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 6314 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/gsp/r535.c:116 r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0xd0/0x190 [nvkm]
[  549.225678] Modules linked in: nvkm(E+) gsp_log(E) snd_seq_dummy(E) snd_hrtimer(E) snd_seq(E) snd_timer(E) snd_seq_device(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) rfkill(E) qrtr(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ipmi_ssif(E) amd_atl(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) mlx5_ib(E) amd64_edac(E) edac_mce_amd(E) kvm_amd(E) ib_uverbs(E) kvm(E) ib_core(E) acpi_ipmi(E) ipmi_si(E) mxm_wmi(E) ipmi_devintf(E) rapl(E) i2c_piix4(E) wmi_bmof(E) joydev(E) ptdma(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) k10temp(E) pcspkr(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) ast(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) drm_shmem_helper(E) nvme_tcp(E) crc32_pclmul(E) ahci(E) drm_kms_helper(E) libahci(E) nvme_fabrics(E) crc32c_intel(E) nvme(E) cdc_ether(E) mlx5_core(E) nvme_core(E) usbnet(E) drm(E) libata(E) ccp(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) mii(E) t10_pi(E) mlxfw(E) sp5100_tco(E) psample(E) pci_hyperv_intf(E) wmi(E) dm_multipath(E) sunrpc(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E) be2iscsi(E) bnx2i(E) cnic(E) uio(E) cxgb4i(E) cxgb4(E) tls(E) libcxgbi(E) libcxgb(E) qla4xxx(E)
[  549.225752]  iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) iscsi_tcp(E) libiscsi_tcp(E) libiscsi(E) scsi_transport_iscsi(E) fuse(E) [last unloaded: gsp_log(E)]
[  549.326293] CPU: 8 PID: 6314 Comm: insmod Tainted: G            E      6.9.0-rc6+ #1
[  549.334039] Hardware name: ASRockRack 1U1G-MILAN/N/ROMED8-NL, BIOS L3.12E 09/06/2022
[  549.341781] RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0xd0/0x190 [nvkm]
[  549.347343] Code: 08 00 00 89 da c1 e2 0c 48 8d ac 11 00 10 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48 85 c9 74 1f c1 e0 0c 4c 8d 6d 30 83 e8 30 89 01 e9 68 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 49 c7 c5 92 ff ff ff e9 5a ff ff ff ba ff ff ff ff be c0 0c
[  549.366090] RSP: 0018:ffffacbccaaeb7d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  549.371315] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000012 RCX: 0000000000923e28
[  549.378451] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000055555554 RDI: ffffacbccaaeb730
[  549.385590] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff8bd14d235f70 R09: ffff8bd14d235f70
[  549.392721] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff8bd14d233864 R12: 0000000000000020
[  549.399854] R13: ffffacbccaaeb818 R14: 0000000000000020 R15: ffff8bb298c67000
[  549.406988] FS:  00007f5179244740(0000) GS:ffff8bd14d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  549.415076] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  549.420829] CR2: 00007fa844000010 CR3: 00000001567dc005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  549.427963] PKRU: 55555554
[  549.430672] Call Trace:
[  549.433126]  <TASK>
[  549.435233]  ? __warn+0x7f/0x130
[  549.438473]  ? r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0xd0/0x190 [nvkm]
[  549.443426]  ? report_bug+0x18a/0x1a0
[  549.447098]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[  549.450589]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  549.454430]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  549.458619]  ? r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0xd0/0x190 [nvkm]
[  549.463565]  r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x46/0x230 [nvkm]
[  549.468257]  r535_gsp_rpc_push+0x106/0x160 [nvkm]
[  549.473033]  r535_gsp_rpc_rm_ctrl_push+0x40/0x130 [nvkm]
[  549.478422]  nvidia_grid_init_vgpu_types+0xbc/0xe0 [nvkm]
[  549.483899]  nvidia_grid_init+0xb1/0xd0 [nvkm]
[  549.488420]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  549.493213]  nvkm_device_pci_probe+0x305/0x420 [nvkm]
[  549.498338]  local_pci_probe+0x46/0xa0
[  549.502096]  pci_call_probe+0x56/0x170
[  549.505851]  pci_device_probe+0x79/0xf0
[  549.509690]  ? driver_sysfs_add+0x59/0xc0
[  549.513702]  really_probe+0xd9/0x380
[  549.517282]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x150
[  549.521640]  driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[  549.525746]  __driver_attach+0xd2/0x1c0
[  549.529594]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[  549.534045]  bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xd0
[  549.537893]  bus_add_driver+0x112/0x210
[  549.541750]  driver_register+0x5c/0x120
[  549.545596]  ? __pfx_nvkm_init+0x10/0x10 [nvkm]
[  549.550224]  do_one_initcall+0x44/0x300
[  549.554063]  ? do_init_module+0x23/0x240
[  549.557989]  do_init_module+0x64/0x240

Calculate the available buffer page before rolling back based on
the result from the waiting.

Signed-off-by: Zhi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
…ex()

[ Upstream commit 082d9e2 ]

Somewhen between 6.10 and 6.11 the driver started to crash on my
MacBookPro14,3. The property doesn't exist and 'tmp' remains
uninitialized, so we pass a random pointer to devm_kstrdup().

The crash I am getting looks like this:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f033c669379
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0001) - permissions violation
PGD 8000000101341067 P4D 8000000101341067 PUD 101340067 PMD 1013bb067 PTE 800000010aee9025
Oops: Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 827 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.11.8-gentoo #1
Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro14,3/Mac-551B86E5744E2388, BIOS 529.140.2.0.0 06/23/2024
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x4/0x30
Code: f7 75 ec 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 f8 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa <80> 3f 00 74 14 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 cc
RSP: 0018:ffffb4aac0683ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: 00007f033c669379 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000cc0 RSI: 00007f033c669379 RDI: 00007f033c669379
RBP: 00000000ffffffea R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000c0ba916a
R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffffffffb61ea260 R12: ffff91f7815b50c8
R13: 0000000000000cc0 R14: ffff91fafefffe30 R15: ffffb4aac0683b30
FS:  00007f033ccbe8c0(0000) GS:ffff91faeed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f033c669379 CR3: 0000000107b1e004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die+0x23/0x70
 ? page_fault_oops+0x149/0x4c0
 ? raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0xe/0x20
 ? sched_balance_newidle+0x22b/0x3c0
 ? update_load_avg+0x78/0x770
 ? exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x150
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
 ? __pfx_pci_conf1_write+0x10/0x10
 ? strlen+0x4/0x30
 devm_kstrdup+0x25/0x70
 brcmf_of_probe+0x273/0x350 [brcmfmac]

Signed-off-by: Stefan Dösinger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e8c193 ]

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit 0141978 upstream.

On some systems, the same CPU (with the same APIC ID) is assigned a
different logical CPU id after commit ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore
invalid x2APIC entries").

This means that Linux enumerates the CPUs in a different order, which
violates ACPI specification[1] that states:

  "OSPM should initialize processors in the order that they appear in
   the MADT"

The problematic commit parses all LAPIC entries before any x2APIC
entries, aiming to ignore x2APIC entries with APIC ID < 255 when valid
LAPIC entries exist. However, it disrupts the CPU enumeration order on
systems where x2APIC entries precede LAPIC entries in the MADT.

Fix this problem by:

 1) Parsing LAPIC entries first without registering them in the
    topology to evaluate whether valid LAPIC entries exist.

 2) Restoring the MADT in order parser which invokes either the LAPIC
    or the X2APIC parser function depending on the entry type.

The X2APIC parser still ignores entries < 0xff in case that #1 found
valid LAPIC entries independent of their position in the MADT table.

Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#madt-processor-local-apic-sapic-structure-entry-order
Cc: All applicable <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore invalid x2APIC entries")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit a3a860b upstream.

The following failure was reported on HPE ProLiant D320:

[   10.693310][    T1] tpm_tis STM0925:00: 2.0 TPM (device-id 0x3, rev-id 0)
[   10.848132][    T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   10.853559][    T1] WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4727 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[   10.862827][    T1] Modules linked in:
[   10.866671][    T1] CPU: 59 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-lp155.2.g52785e2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 588cd98293a7c9eba9013378d807364c088c9375
[   10.882741][    T1] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL320 Gen12/ProLiant DL320 Gen12, BIOS 1.20 10/28/2024
[   10.892170][    T1] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[   10.898103][    T1] Code: 24 08 e9 4a fe ff ff e8 34 36 fa ff e9 88 fe ff ff 83 fe 0a 0f 86 b3 fd ff ff 80 3d 01 e7 ce 01 00 75 09 c6 05 f8 e6 ce 01 01 <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 e5 fe ff ff f7 c2 00 00 08 00 75 42 89 d9 80 e1
[   10.917750][    T1] RSP: 0000:ffffb7cf40077980 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   10.923777][    T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000040cc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   10.931727][    T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000040cc0

The above transcript shows that ACPI pointed a 16 MiB buffer for the log
events because RSI maps to the 'order' parameter of __alloc_pages_noprof().
Address the bug by moving from devm_kmalloc() to devm_add_action() and
kvmalloc() and devm_add_action().

Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.16+
Fixes: 55a82ab ("[PATCH] tpm: add bios measurement log")
Reported-by: Andy Liang <[email protected]>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219495
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andy Liang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
MingcongBai pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 18, 2025
commit b0fce54 upstream.

syz reports an out of bounds read:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0
fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline]
ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline]
ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078
ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981
ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003
ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad
RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000
</TASK>
==================================================================

And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert:

==================================================================
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768
JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data
mode.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted
6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280
Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00
e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6
04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292
vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088
do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89
f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08
0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8
64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000103
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:
00007f2dafda3a99
RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI:
00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09:
000055555a6784c0
R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffe336a6680
R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15:
00007f2dafdec03b
</TASK>
==================================================================

The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode.  For
ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero.

Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry().  It
fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called
before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert().  Also set a up limit for dir with
OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL.  The i_size can't be great than blocksize.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/[email protected]/T/#u
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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